

12 April

Henton

Golden

Stew / Klein / Kershaw
Brooks

White Papers, 61, 65

Braffman - Berlin

on - Sept 69

to Oct 1 69

to Oct 70

now

[Can I introduce any new info?
as evidence. 

or will they call for all?

- Should we get into paper - we are glad
to have That is how others?

Stern — does a track system?

Klein

Kershaw

Zoldan

Don Harris

Deitschman^v: ARPA Project

Johston^v

Pontius^v

Copan DE option to cols: 1964-67-68

EGL - Chan

Rankin, Walshy : showed to RFK?

Dave Bunker — on ECK, Sept? 1969

Peter Szanton?

Haral — on WSEG

CN

Function of DE testing:

ONLY: IMAGE; WARM, LIKEABLE

modest

(not: expert
esxpert
distant/not
cold...)

- present myself as me "the kind of guy
thy want to have home for dinner and
some bread baking to." If give them
any excuse to let me off, thy will.

Tell story of facts.

State of mind.

Expert testing — cont.

CN: intro framework — no detail.

jobs, educ, for work, RAND work, VN.
(relationships, G.D.Ill.)

(By my object — not technically achievable —
but judge will give some latitude.

[If blocked — shift to "state of mind."
rationale.]

Facts on work with PP

12 April

- self-determination
- civil war: NLF "minority."
- why ARVN didn't fight, why GVN was corrupt
(why NLF was stronger)
- Secrecy as Inside Dope

UN Glantz
Sec. of State.

Vital interest

Friend: at Atlanta Glantz

choose 1st language

(Burmese bridge)

CN: modest; many can identify
with, "my problem,"

Not: expert
background

Not: DC vs. President (as war
liar
criminal)
or DC vs. America

(America war
aggression
anyone's and not to know
culpability)

But Congress was bind to,
and public.

MMAM

CN/DE

Accepting notion of sole responsibility
led me to rationalize dereliction of
Congress, council process, int'l. actions -
~~DESPITE CONSTITUTION "OBsolete"~~
Analj PP [Other explanations didn't
apply in 1940-50] made it no easier
that sole responsibility = sole reason
for error, failure

and sole respons. for ending a war
- short of clear-cut success - is too great
a burden for one man.

[Balte; ECK ... share responsibility
(former Adm. officials...) — (1) but they
won't. I concluded...

by George

(2) Hard for people to believe — they
didn't want to believe that Pres could
conceal his clear intentions, or fail to end war shortly.
("Enemies" knew this — needed no proof —
but the non "loyal" the American, the non
trustworthy of the Pres.)

Analogies: Decision, game-player (sign act) 2.

Error control, error-correcting systems:

Thermostat; gen.

Pers = Player

= Controller.

Adaptive systems; intelligent
machines; problem-solving;
SELF-REGULATING SYSTEM

Assumed: better than alternative.

(But — Churchill — democracy is the
worst form of gov, except for every
other kind — namely present one.)

(Compare "function of gov control of info")
to Exe control.

But (VN) a system with human
components even

But PP Paradox: 1961 (like 1964-65.)

Various Apps — eliminated (esp in 1940-50)

Same ^{AT HIGH LEVEL - LIKE COV.} ness of policy — repetition — seen from
inside — lack of "learning" —

despite ^{people (Congress, public)}

— Pers missed — first in same way as
subordinates. Hyp: for some reasons.

He too, was human; needed resources; wanted
to keep his job; didn't want to "fail."

CN: - just say, I copied these (?) volumes.

- emphasize new appreciation of role of Congress

~~I~~ ~~was~~ negligent & was wrong
earlier - in attitude, and in

"Gov can control info; but not
Expt from Congress. From people?"

(SELF-GOVERNING COUNTRY)

See "Governor" of steam engine.

Can't run so if Pres is "the
controller" and all reporting to the
public is by the Pres.

Earlier Pres' ^{replies, many, from} ~~replies, many, from~~
as part of the problem

- for VNm, for US Gov, for public - for Pres
himself! [= his unconst process].

Earlier: thought lying to the Pres was very
different from lying by the Pres.

Basic "discovery" - Pres notions + actions are
similar to those of subordinates. (Not only
"litter" - more angelic than Congress, press....)

- How respond to:

Is it not a fact in
Is it not true...?

(when Tg Nixon could not know
(b) it is not true.

9 April

- Jay: afternoon: getting supper with ON—
talking to ON, not jury.

says "not like 9 to 5 — it was casual."

X
August, 1965 - Sept 66

talked to AR on 1st visit to villa
(near Pasture) talked $\frac{1}{2}$ hr.

Other times — with others, at dinner, parties,
 $\frac{1}{2}$ dozen.

casual acquaintances.

Sept 66 - Feb 67 critique

Feb - 67 - Econ + Social Committee

April 67 - went into crop destruction study — asked by
Bill Davis, Tom having been fired.

about July 4 - finished crop destruction ^{study} — saw DE

("Lessons from VN" — "helping out McN")

Know DE

[NO]

Sept 66 - Aug 67 : travel with Jean Roberts

*[#] Sept Aug 26 - returns Feb 68

worked on Econ + Social Committee

I saw AR in first week in August, 67

Cell JR

March - April '68 caption findings
income posting related to security

late April ^{was my} — told AR, "I understand you're going
back to college, so we don't budgeted for
you." (AR had told four) ... "till the end of the year."

Went to St. Paul Society, Cambridge
gave critique of Mitchell-Milstein paper

[I was in Chicago, No More UN's; RFT All]

AR left about April 23 — from Europe.

Sharon
May — round trip Shade Home Roundtrip

Sharon Bright
Bonnie Kile
Vangie Johnson
Joe Lester
Ed Brunner

[Nov 3 - RFK

~~~~~ Feb 17, 69 to Wash (Hag-Adams)

back ~ March 4, 69

briefed HSR, Wolf, etc., 10:30 5 March

ECR meeting on VN questions 7 March

4 April: DE Seminar: Violent Politics in VN

16 May - Pat arrives

25 May - Bayesian Decision Theory

27-28 May Columbus Ohio, <sup>Richard</sup> Nixon

14-16 June Saudi (on way to India)

June 22? Saudi leave

July 18 Vietnam Camp on Hill

July 24-25 Mitchell Seminar

July 27 Daoli-Wu (Yenan)

Sgt Sullivan - 8 July  
Bobrow APR 15 July

August 4, 1969 Vietnam arrives in CA

25-28 August Norfolk

25-28 Agent Haneyford

9 AM, Sept 18 Lawyer, Keller, et al meeting

Sept 19, Rosenberg (FBI) —

(24 dinner with Roberts)

26 Wallinch  
28 Left Keller, SF

(30 left....

6 Oct BSR - letter to NYT  
S - See

Under way  
Dan Harris

1X-15 Feb. 1965 Baguio

9 March - 15 Baguio

April 2-3 HERO Congress (EGG, HCC, Convex)

Monday '65 (4:30 a.m.: VTM - Harday ??)  
April 12 - Pat Marx party

Thursday:

April 16, Friday  
Pat Marx

Saturday, April 17 - Passover  
Pear Month

Sunday, April 18, Easter  
cherry blossoms

20 April Pat. 100 talk

24 April Antwerp

15 May National Trunk-in

19 May Rockcliffe

July 13 Pende Silver, Alan Whiting  
15 Colby, Lundell  
(Hollister meeting)

16 July 9:30 Vance

(19 July - to pick up coin)

7 August Chiger meeting / Lundell  
11 August Nine Dm (Colby; Chiger)  
12 August 9:30 Hazelworth

14 August - call VTM, resign

20 Aug : 4: Lundell, Bill Bundy

22 Aug : Dolman / Lundell grasp

30 Aug? anime VN

5 Sept John Van

Col. Hollis  
Mr. Collins

DE talk about:

- NOT: - Swakami

- RAND function - "live-crosses"

- Swakami?

- Missile Def; Gilpatric<sup>speed</sup>; SIOP; Ann Arbor  
- authorizes to SACEUR,

YES: - USCP? }  
- UA? } MCG; Gilpatric  
- PAC  
- JFK and PSALM ?

Pres/SecDef lost of  
info, control.

Knowledge of strategy: Plans (S)

dis: SU-OB  
missile Def

C+C

R-290, etc; interlocking

(Clearances)

Cuba II; Crisis Study: U-2  
WESG Studies; Shultz Study

Leaks:

Fryklund; Richardson/\_\_\_\_; R-290; Gaither;  
Kahn; Kilian, Sorenson, Seale; Hughes, Donovan;  
Cuba II; Missile Def/Airops;

AC

Jerry Rose / Chay ; J. Lang ; Poe

(- Honshu? Hondo?)

Report to Pres? Komar; III Corps; ...  
(Cadre... trips...)

## RAMJET

Oct '66 : HCV memo / Kat

Chair?

Rach Kim ; Patrol; ...

Koc Tien?

Politicians : Ky mmo.

DE/De mmo.

Wheeler - Walker / DE mmo.

Altitudes (ISA; RAND)

NSM-1

Chairman book: 1967 : no right //

(?) legitimate; justifies 221

RFK?

(Torture: 222)  
(?) comparison to

SC in Hungary 222

(7 Aug. 1956: DE = OSNC)

(no SC, UK, French, Brasilia) & they'll then we were on side of right

## Rainbow in VN to citizens

Bad still on NLF, VC; Complain

Passing of ARVN SMO 5th Div Dec '65

Resolution of VC + malnutrition

Rock Kim (no. Cannon)

Reaction of US troops ("need" to violate orders)  
sort of "progress" or products of it; STALEMATE

[cognitive problem: Pres has diff info]

We don't understand, learn;

image of GVN, whether it will win

whether it deserves to be put

(would USG support a reformed GVN?)

— [Civic problem: Pres doesn't understand effects  
of seeing, by diff info.]

[Ignores: class basis of GVN, NLF — and USG]

Crisis: <sup>3)</sup> Outsiders can't learn inside process

or perception of "problem" [out: "probli-  
sm by outsiders don't way just because of diff info"]

(b) outsiders control to outsiders, nothing to learn: + outsiders' dyn.

Failure to learn, - turn over

- lack of SA, histories, info
- ignorance of French & spine
- ignorance of NCF, VNair, VN
- Concreteness of need to learn

Military side of pac.      Security  
RF/PF, intell  
mobilization  
air/air

What I did not observe... ~

(VNAR US low level advisors were good on  
observation of performance — based on draconian  
prescription.)

See Taylor, etc... as VC "agency."

I saw as "following in French footsteps, about learning;  
but then, and we had been ~~told~~ French (or some  
sort of),

In 64-65, USG responded to "complaint"; knowing  
"things were bad." But we had to go to so bad;  
and they had me go to complaint.

Hyp: optimism, bad reporting. 1965-67 seemed  
to confirm this. (SOT; we had always known, at decision  
points; we got complaint = 1945, "First War.")

Rand: PKD 62

Study of old Rand SA's, NIE's  
(March Sep; range of 50)

63 - James  
Ec Club, NATO think

VN: TG

Seaborne

~~Top~~ 344 - provocation election

host - paper for collapse

Bucky Pluth, On Mon

White Paper, IC should

troops; combat

Troop - us

To go - USAIC, EGL

DC assumption: US "not" to learn how to  
conduct R = US right to also

Perceptrons - sight + analog neurons

bulbs, am

affines, output is then a diff<sup>n</sup>  
parts of organism

Positive control pos. capacity

Open-loop system

Seeing requires feedback

"error" will not be repeated

and for 50 stop signal

+ so entirely go anticipation, sight,  
interpretation

"Collapsible system" of CEC

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2 reasons for going Road

1 for extrinsic = mains

1 for going mains

3 for saying going to VN

1 for going 000

I distrusted : being from Pres  
(USCP; SCOP; etc)  
W.S.C.G. Studios; (CST); Minibuf  
Pac/ARVV/Compton/GRVN/NKF.  
Lack of studios

Not explanation - 64-65; but I  
thought they helped.  
They would contribute to Pres

PP → company, ballyhoo.


Finally, can't distract being from  
Congress

self-giving;

Public was mixed (1960, 64, 68); money  
was not!

Somers → withdrawn (not Party, personally)  
neutral (not not - ballyhoo.)

Contract for public ("Ag is a foreign  
analyst could find useful - can be used by  
public")



Count employed?  
Who book published?

I know?

1. Birth
2. Marriage      Children
3. Present employment + latest.
4. Academic background. (scholarships)
5. Marriage
6. Employment.
7. VN      (Time reporting.)
8. Views on best ways to help the country.
9. Description of PP and of work.
10. Access to PP at RANO ~~&~~ S.Y
11. "      "      " at Rand ~~S.P.~~ DC.
12. Getting papers to Rand, S.Y. - <sup>note, hrs</sup> 134 - Ring & Morrison
13. Getting 2d batch to Rand, August, 69.
14. ~~Getting~~ the PP-LESSONS, '69 Holt - me. (C.N.: stay away from JCS)
15. ~~Planning~~ Decision to print papers. (in Dino)
16. Baltic letter - alternatives to disclosure.  
Rand letter. (ECK; McNamee, Womble)

17. Decision to give to Congress.  
(then sent).

18. Implementation of decision.  
(S) + JCS 21 + ~~NSC~~ ~~NSC~~ Shultz

19. Awareness<sup>?</sup> of violation of law or regulation  
294 Conflicting loyalties/obligations: Const.

GV

- What s they do - not what you should think. Don't believe you:
- Is forcing the Pres does not work - to help the cont., adequately.

(is Pres is able to take the big decision - by himself - to end the war.)

Then Burn - lying to

My conclusion were... others just draw others - but they ought to have a right to draw.

Long history of war...  
wrong from lying; easier  
from lying...

1. How did you come to apply to join the Marine Corps in 1953?  
(3 reasons)
2. Was there any influence to your joining?  
(Kille)
3. Did any <sup>other</sup> event in Indochina take place while you were in O.C.S.?

W.M. Haskins

4. Were you offered a regular commission?  
Yes
- 4a. Did you accept it?  
No
- 4b. Why not?  
1st Lt - ~~soldier~~ the day on in 2d Div.
5. What was your rank as a rifle company commander?  
1st Lt - ~~soldier~~ the day on in 2d Div.
- 6.

6. How did you come to extend your tour in 1956?

(cont'd)

7. How did you come to be asked to join the Rand Corporation in 1959?  
4 factors

8. Was there a common theme to your professional work between 1959 and 1969?  
If so, what was it?  
With

9. What was the subject matter of your professional work from 1959 to 1969 in the decade after 1959?

△ Protecting + improving the national security of the U.S. (goes back to USMC)

10. Was there a common focus to that work?  
If so, tell me just what it was.

11. Please continue or describe your description from yesterday of that work in the 1960's.